

# The Devil Is In The Detail



Adam Daniel - Ruxcon 2014

## Introduction - Who Am I

---

- Stared working in Data Recovery and Data Conversion in 1992 with Doctor Disk.
- Begun working in Computer Forensics in 1998 with Forensic Data Services.
- Worked for Deloitte and Ernst and Young in their forensic and eDiscovery divisions for a number of years.
- Original Ruxcon crew (Did the 1<sup>st</sup> talk at the 1st rux in 2003).
- Now a Manager with Ferrier Hodgson Forensic IT.

# Computer Forensic Tools - A Brief History

---

## Direct Disk and Binary/Hex editors

- Nortons Disk Edit
- Winhex
- Acronis
- Media Tools
- Linux Binary Editors\Custom Recovery Tools

## Capabilities

- Direct Disk Access
- Media data surface analysis in hex.
- File system analysis (Partition tables, FAT tables, MFT).
- Simple keyword searching (no indexing).
- Data recovery and extraction (File system repair, simple carving)

# Computer Forensic Tools - A Brief History

---

## Dedicated Forensic Analysis tools.

- Encase (Expert Witness)
- Forensic Tool Kit (FTK)
- Xways (Winhex)
- FEX - Forensic Explorer (Just released)

## Capabilities

- Media data surface analysis in hex.
- File system analysis.
- Artefact Analysis.
- Compound file support.
- Advanced keyword searching (indexing in FTK, bookmarks).
- File viewers.
- Galley Viewer
- Data Carving, Data recovery.
- Advanced Scripting (Enscript)
- Advanced categorisation (FTK)

# Computer Forensic Tools - A Brief History

## Advanced File Analysis and legal review.

- NUIX
- Intella
- Legal review platforms (Relativity, Ringtail, EDT)

## Capabilities

- Advanced meta data extraction.
- Compound file support.
- Advanced keyword searching (Complex Queries).
- Text Analytics, Visual Analytics.
- File format support.
- Data Carving, Data recovery.
- Advanced Scripting (Nuix).
- Advanced legal review functionality

# Computer Forensic Tools - A Brief History

## Artefact Analysis and Timeline Generation. (Point and Click scriptkiddy forensics?)

- Log2timeline
- Internet Evidence Finder
- Various individual tools, scripts, parsers.

## Capabilities

- Individual Artefact analysis modules
- Visual Timeline generation (IEF)
- Non-standard artefact modules
- Centralised reporting
- Expanding support for new analysis techniques (Shellbags, Cloud storage)
- Data offsets, contextual data provided.

## File System

- MFT, File Entries, FAT, Log, Journal

## Registry

- MU lists, USB Analysis, Proprietary software entries

## Link Files

- Recent Files, Most Used, Shortcuts

## Jump Lists

- Recent Files, Most Used, Shortcuts

## Internet History

- Searches, Web history, Recent files, Webmail, Cloud

## Email

- Sent, Received, Recipient Lists, address books, calendar, Web mail

## Instant messenger

- Discussions, files sent, system access

## System Restore Points

- Registry Backups, File backs, Links files etc

## Prefetch

- Software Access

## Shell Bags


- File access, Software Access

## Time Line Case Study - Online Fraud

- Australian Manufacturing organisation
- Numerous Asia-Pac suppliers
- Approximately \$1 million fraud
- Attacker utilised a weak point in the business process (supplier IT security, payment process)
- “Man-in-the-middle” style deception
- Analysis Tools Used - Nux, LibPDF, ExifTool
- Time Line Analysis




# Time Line Case Study - Online Fraud



## • Early September 2013


- Supplier “hacked” by unknown group (1)
- Causes minor interruption in business processes between supplier and client
- Hacking incident is mentioned to the client in an informal email. (2)
- Supplier contact utilises a account for communications with client
- Attacker begins monitoring supplier operations

# Time Line Case Study - Online Fraud




## • Late September 2013

- Supplier sends a payment reminder email to client (\$1 million) (3)
- Attacker observes outgoing email. Creates a web based account with a name very similar to the supplier's personal account (4)




- **Late September 2013**

- Attacker sends an email from the fake account to the client providing new banking details. States need to change the account due to an audit. (5)
- Over the course of the next three days the attacker resends this three times



## • Late September 2013


- Client (following standard policies) requests that the change is verified via a formal letter signed by Supplier MD on company letterhead. (6)
- Attacker disables the client's email server with a Denial of Service attack (7)
- Creates a Yahoo email account under the name of the client account manager  
Sends a request to supplier for a document signed by MD "for their records".



## • Early October 2013

- Email to the Supplier uses the same tactics (previous text, sig block etc).
- Supplier sends a PDF'd letterhead document and sends to the attacker (8)
- Attacker edits the PDF to reflect the desired bank account changes (9)
- Attacker sends the altered PDF to the Client. The client now has a formal, signed request to alter the bank account details on Supplier letterhead (10)


# Case Study - A Complex Attack



## • Early October 2013

- Supplier had been trying to send a follow up email to the legit client during the email server downtime. When the server is repaired this email arrives.
- Client responds that the payment is going through soon (11)
- Attacker sends an email to the client reinforcing the changed bank account details.

# Time Line Case Study - Online Fraud



## • Early October 2013

- Client makes payment into attackers bank account.
- Supplier informs Client that payment has not been received (13)
- Client replies stating that payment should have gone through (14)
- Attacker replies to this email stating that there have been problems with their accounts and not to worry about it for a few days (15)

# Questions or Comments?

---

[Adam.daniel@fh.com.au](mailto:Adam.daniel@fh.com.au)



**DON'T LET THE ALIENS PROBE YOUR BUM!**  
**JOIN THE RESISTANCE!**

